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Abstract 
The paper is devoted to the analysis of the equity-efficiency relationship from the standpoint of 
the proposed double criterion of efficiency as opposed to the criterion of Pareto-efficiency. The 
equity-efficiency relationship with an extremum, obtained in the paper exceeds the boundaries of 
the traditional approach to this problem. Empirical verification of the proposed model shows that it 
corresponds to the facts much better than the traditional equity-efficiency trade-off model. 
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Introduction 
 
Recently, the question of the relationship between equity and efficiency has been widely 
discussed in a growing number of investigations. The traditional approach to this question is that 
society has to choose between equity and efficiency. This idea was classically formulated by Okun 
in his well-known book “Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-off”. He wrote: “The pursuit of 
efficiency necessarily creates inequalities. And hence society faces a trade-off between equality and 
efficiency” and “…the conflict between equality and economic efficiency is inescapable” (Okun 
1975). 
His famous “leaky bucket experiment” has found further reflection in economic literature. 
The basic idea is that a sum of money obtained by poorer individuals in the tax-transfer process 
appears to be less than a sum of money taken from richer ones. This results in reduction in total 
income and less efficient use of resources. For instance, as notes Burtless (1986), summarizing the 
results of a series of the negative income tax experiments held in the 1970s in the US, in order to 
increase family incomes by $1 the government had to spend almost $2. This leakage was mostly 
accounted for by the fact that higher transfers induced reductions in labour supply. 
Another example of a leaky bucket is unemployment insurance. Katz and Meyer (1990) 
showed that each additional week of benefit availability increased unemployment spells by 0.16 to 
0.20 weeks. 
The other side of the problem is inefficiencies related to the tax system. For example, 
Feldstein (1999) estimates that the efficiency loss from current income taxes is more than 30 
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percent and 50 percent if social security taxes are included. According to Ballard, Shoven and 
Whalley (1985), losses connected with the US tax system were approximately 13% to 24% for 
every dollar raised. The importance of tax structure optimisation has induced a lot of investigations 
on this problem. For instance, questions of optimal taxation with respect to economic efficiency are 
discussed by Auerbach and Hines (2001). 
Thus, there is no doubt that leaky buckets and inefficiencies are characteristic of the tax-
transfer system. However, some economists take a different approach to the relationship between 
equity and efficiency. For instance, Baumol (1988) shows that the equity-efficiency trade-off in 
economic decision-making does not have to be as great as generally believed. Blank (2002), 
analysing extensive empirical data, focused her attention on policy situations in which equity and 
efficiency are not inevitably in conflict with each other. According to Jackson (2000), the 
relationship between taxes as a share of GDP and growth and productivity is weak and insignificant, 
while the relationship to inequality measures is strong and significant, which is not consistent with 
the idea that higher public consumption financed through the tax-transfer system comes at the cost 
of lost efficiency. The basic that there is a complex equity-efficiency relationship with an extremum 
was set forth in Arkhiiereiev (1999). 
Much attention in the studies of equity and efficiency has been paid to the relationship 
between inequality and economic growth. Traditional theory says that inequality and economic 
growth are positively correlated. For example, Kaldor (1957) and Pasinetti (1962) developed this 
point. Such an approach has found a lot of opponents. Among them, one could mention, for 
instance, Alesina and Rodrik (1994). In general, as Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) note, 
the view that inequality is growth-enhancing has been challenged by a number of empirical studies, 
often based on cross-country regressions of GDP growth on income inequality. They all find a 
negative correlation between the average rate of growth and a number of measures of inequality. 
Thus, there is no universal approach to the problem of the relationship between equity and 
efficiency, and opposite points of view can be found in the literature. But the typical character of the 
studies on this problem is that major attention is paid to redistribution processes affecting inequality 
(although taxes and transfers alter both the post-tax and pre-tax distribution of earnings (Stiglitz 
1987)). Our major goal is to discuss first of all the influence of initial distribution on economic 
efficiency. 
 
A. Theoretical models 
 
Theoretical substantiation of the inverse equity-efficiency relationship model is usually 
focussed on pointing out efficiency losses arising in the process of product redistribution. Such an 
approach is confined to a single factor affecting the analyzed relationship, namely redistribution of 
income coming into being in the process of production. However, such an approach implicitly 
presupposes that the character of product distribution in the process of production does not affect its 
efficiency. Since this assumption is not obvious, it is necessary to consider the case of the influence 
of distribution relations on production efficiency. 
In order to find whether each of the assumptions corresponds to the facts, in this section of 
the paper we construct the models based on deliberate differentiation of the cases of dependence 
and independence of production outcome on the character of distribution. 
 
I. The Case of Independence of Production Outcome on Distribution Relations 
 
Consider first the case of independence of production outcome of the character of 
distribution. In order to simplify the model suppose that there are only two entities (two groups) 
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taking part in the joint process of production of a single good. They execute different functional 
roles and distribute the created product of some given volume 
 constQ  , (1) 
between them such that 
 , (2) 21 QQQ 
where Q1 and Q2 are the quantities of the product obtained by the first and the second entity 
respectively. 
Let  denote the share of the product obtained by the first entity. Then the relationship 
between Q1, Q2 and  are given by the following equations: 
 ; (3) QQ  1
 . (4) QQ  )1(2 
This case is illustrated in Figure 1 where the volume of production Q is plotted against the 
share in output of the first entity. In the case of a multi-product model, it is necessary to consider the 
utility of a product instead of its quantity. Other regularities remain unchanged. The dependence of 
the volumes of the product QA1 and QA2 obtained by the first and the second entity, respectively, on 
 are shown for the volume of production QA which is constant and independent of distribution. 
According to (2), the following equation is true of any point m: . In Figure 1, the 
same dependences are shown for the volume of production QB which is greater than QA. One can 
see that the quantities of the product obtained both by the first and the second entity increase for a 
larger total volume of production and invariable position of point m. 
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Fig. 1: The Case of Independence of the Volume of Production 
on the Character of Product Distribution. 
 
The consumption possibilities line QAQA, corresponding to the volume of production QA, is 
constructed in the coordinates Q1 and Q2 in Figure 2. It is positioned at an angle of 45 to the 
coordinate axes and shows the relationship between the quantities of the product consumed by both 
entities under conditions of invariability of its total volume. The values of  and  are defined 
by the value  which is reflected in Figure 2 by point M at the intersection of the consumption 
possibilities line QAQA and the distribution line Od drawn at an angle of  to the axis OQ1 from the 
origin of coordinates, and 
M
AQ 1
M
AQ 2
 4
  
 

  1
1
2
m
A
M
A
Q
Q
tg  (5) 
indicates the proportion of distribution of the produced goods irrespective of their absolute value. A 
larger production level  corresponds to larger consumption possibilities, and the 
corresponding consumption possibilities line shifts to position QBQB. 
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Fig. 2: The Relationship between the Values of the Product Obtained by Entities if 
the Volume of Production is Independent on the Character of Distribution. 
 
The value of  being unchanged, the values  and  of the product obtained by the 
entities are defined by point N at the intersection of the consumption possibilities line QBQB with 
the same distribution line Od. An increase in the share of the first entity, which manifests itself in an 
increase in , leads to a decrease in the angle , i.e. to a turn of the distribution line, for example, to 
position Og. The values of the product ,  and , , obtained by the entities, are 
determined in this case by points P and L at the intersection of the consumption possibilities lines 
QAQA and QBQB with a new distribution line Og. 
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Changes in tg , reflecting the character of product distribution between entities, do not 
result in changes in the total amount of the product (QA or QB respectively), the latter being a good 
indicator of production efficiency. Therefore, the equity-efficiency relationship at this stage of 
product reproduction may be represented as a vertical line. If losses arising in the process of product 
redistribution are taken into account, it is transformed into the inverse relationship characteristic of 
the traditional model. 
 
II. The Case of Dependence of Production Outcome on Distribution Relations 
 
Now we shall move on to consider the case of the influence of distribution relations on the 
volume of production in the single-product model. As in the previous case, where the volume of 
production was unchanged, consider first the dependence of the volume of production and the 
amount of the product obtained by the first and the second entity on the share of the product 
obtained by the first entity (). Suppose the first entity performs direct production activities, while 
the other performs entrepreneurial functions concerning the organization of production including 
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the combination of productive factors. The character of the function Q() may be determined on the 
basis of the following well-known principles. 
If the share of the first entity in the product produced is small enough and increases 
gradually, one may expect an increase in its value due to overcoming the “avoidance effect”, i.e. 
incomplete use of potential productivity caused by low wages. This principle is reflected by the 
rising part of the graph Q() in Figure 3. (For more information about wage models and efficiency, 
see Yellen 1984). 





Q
Q2
Q1
Q
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Q1 MAX
Q2 MAX
QMAX
Q =Q1 2
 
Fig. 3: The Case of Dependence of the Volume of Production 
on the Character of Product Distribution. 
 
A further increase in  results in a decrease in Q as a consequence of growing disincentives 
to efficient entrepreneurship due to the reduction in entrepreneurial income (as was in detail 
analysed in supply-side economics and practically implemented in Reaganomics). It should be 
noted that this argument is also used in classical economics for justifying the necessity of granting 
sufficient freedom to market forces to bring about a reduction in the wage level. The influence of 
this factor is reflected by the decreasing part of the graph Q(). 
The result of the simultaneous influence of the mentioned factors is shown in Figure 3. The 
information about the concave curve Q() allows us to find the dependence of the volume of the 
product obtained by each of the producers on the share of the first entity in the total volume of 
production. These dependences are shown in Figure 3 by means of the curve Q1 for the first entity 
and the curve Q2 for the second one. The volume of the product produced Q is of maximal value if 
the distribution rate  equals 2. The value of  at which Q1 reaches its maximum, given the 
function Q(), can be found by setting the derivative of the function (3) with respect to  equal to 
zero. 
Thus, we obtain the following condition for maximization of Q1: 
 0 Q
d
dQ 

 (6) 
which requires the elasticity of the curve Q() being equal to one: 
 1)(  Qd
dQEQ


. (7) 
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In Figure 3, the condition for a maximal value of Q1 holds if  = 4. 
Analogically, equating the derivative of function (4) with respect to  to zero, we obtain the 
following condition for the maximization of Q2: 
 0)1(  Q
d
dQ 

 (8) 
to which the following elasticity of the curve Q() corresponds: 
 


 

1)( Qd
dQEQ . (9) 
In Figure 3, the maximum of Q2 obtains if  = 1. 
The analysis of the obtained relationships shows that both agents can increase the values of 
the product obtained by them within the range of variable  to the left of 1. If  = 1, maximization 
of the product obtained by the second agent (entrepreneur) takes place, and it is evident that the 
Pareto-efficient states of the economy, i.e. states in which the first entity’s consumption cannot be 
increased without a decrease in the other entity’s consumption, are obtained within the range of 
variable  from 1 to 4 inclusive. Thus, as theory tells us, maximization of entrepreneurial income, 
achieved by the second entity if  = 1, results in attainment of a Pareto-efficient state of the 
economy. However, as is seen from Figure 3, such maximization in general case does not lead to the 
achievement of maximal production efficiency which is determined by the value of total output 
produced, given costs unchanged, and takes place if  = 2. Maximization of the product obtained 
by the first entity (providing direct production activities), which is the case if  = 4, does not allow 
us either to attain maximal efficiency of production though it results in a Pareto-efficient state of the 
economy. 
We can come to the same conclusion analyzing the consumption possibilities curve. It can 
be constructed in the coordinates Q1 and Q2 on the basis of the information contained in Figure 3 by 
analogy with the case of independence of production results of the character of distribution depicted 
in Figure 2. Taking into account the influence of distribution relations, the shape of the consumption 
possibilities curve will be essentially different from the latter case. If in Figure 2 the consumption 
possibilities line coincides with one of the equal product lines, the concave consumption 
possibilities curve, obtained in Figure 4, cuts a set of such lines. Each of the distinctive points R, S, 
T, U on this curve, corresponding to the values of  equal to 1, 2, 3, 4 in Figure 4, is 
characterized by its own value of the product and the shares obtained by each of the entities. The 
value Q2 is maximized at point R ( = 1), therefore, the tangent to the consumption possibilities 
line drawn through it is a horizontal line. The greatest volume of production Qmax corresponds to 
point S ( = 2), since the tangent at this point is the line with the volume of production greater in 
comparison to all other equal product lines having common points with the consumption 
possibilities line. Point T ( = 3) is at the intersection of this line with the equal distribution line 
starting from the origin of coordinates at an angle of 45. Finally, point U ( = 4) corresponds to 
maximization of the value Q1, therefore, the tangent to the consumption possibilities line is vertical 
at this point. The part of the consumption possibilities line between points R and U is a set of 
Pareto-efficient distributions, where an increase in the quantity consumed by one of the individuals 
is accompanied with a decrease in that consumed by the other one. 
 
III. Distribution Relations and Social Welfare Functions 
 
Points R, S, T, U bear direct relation to different social welfare functions. The tangents to 
points R and U in Figure 4 are indifference lines showing equal social welfare levels on the 
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assumption that welfare of one of the entities of production is completely disregarded. The tangent 
to point S is the indifference line for the Benthamian social welfare function reflecting 
maximization of aggregate consumption irrespective of its distribution. The line starting from the 
origin of coordinates at an angle of 45 corresponds to the social welfare maximization line in 
accordance with the theory of supporters of full equality. 
Q2
R
S
T
U
0
45 
45
Q1  
Fig. 4: The Relationship between the Values of the Product Obtained by Entities 
if the Volume of Production Depends on the Character of Distribution. 
 
Indifference lines for other social utility levels can be represented according to this theory as 
an aggregate of pairs of lines diverging upwards and downwards from the equal distribution line at 
equal angles marked as  in Figure 5. 
In the same figure, one can see that some other social welfare functions have maximums at 
the same distinctive points. The right-angled indifference curve VTW, drawn through point T, 
corresponds to the Rawlsian social welfare function which determines the welfare level by the 
amount of the product consumed by the least well-off members of society. The right-angled 
indifference curve XYZ, drawn through point R, pertains to the so-called Nietzschean social welfare 
function reflecting maximization of welfare of the most well-off members of society. 
However, in reality, society does not follow any of the mentioned criteria, and peculiarities 
of distribution take shape depending on the bargaining power of entities of production. 
Theoretically, it is possible to reach a compromise within the section RU of the consumption 
possibilities line lying between the points at which maximization of the respective entity’s 
consumption takes place. Such a solution could be possible in case of a bilateral monopoly which 
could be considered within the limits of this model but is rarely found in reality. The different roles 
of the entities involved in the process of production should be taken into account in practice. Since 
the second entity performs the main organizational functions, its bargaining power may be expected 
to be much greater, and a compromise will be reached within the part of the consumption 
possibilities line acceptable for it. The second entity as the agent performing the functions of 
organization of production is most likely guided by the production efficiency criterion as an 
integrated social welfare criterion, where production efficiency manifests itself in maximization of 
the product produced. We know that such maximization is reached at point S, thus a compromise 
acceptable for the organizer of production will be chosen within the section RS. 
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Fig. 5: Estimation of the Product Distribution Efficiency in accordance with 
Social Welfare Functions. 
 
Consider the optimality of this choice from the standpoint of the whole society. The section 
RS is Pareto-optimal as it is part of the curve RU. However, it is universally recognized that the 
criterion of Pareto efficiency is individualistic, i.e. connected with welfare of each individual and is 
not connected with inequality, i.e. with the character of income distribution (Stiglitz J. E., 1988). At 
the same time, a social optimality criterion with obvious efficiency and inequality indicators should 
be used for the evaluation of consumption allocations. In this respect, two criteria may be proposed 
since it is impossible to give preference to any of them. 
The first criterion may be the one which is natural if the situation is analyzed from the 
viewpoint of the whole society: given equal inequality rates, from two variants of distribution the 
one providing a greater total value of the product produced should be chosen. In other words, 
distribution is efficient from the standpoint of the first criterion if any other distribution, given the 
same inequality rate, cannot provide a higher total product to the society. It is plausible to use a ratio 
between the income of the least well-off entity and the income of the most well-off one as an 
indicator of inequality, i.e. to consider 




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
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, if 
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2
QQ
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The section of the analyzed consumption possibilities line RSTU satisfying this criterion can 
be found by means of constructing distribution lines diverging to equal angles  from the full 
equality line and comparing the values of the product produced Q at intersections with the 
consumption possibilities line.  
In Figure 6, such distribution lines Oe and Of cross the consumption possibilities line at 
points E and F through which the lines QEQE and QFQF are drawn showing corresponding values 
QE and QF of the product produced, QE being greater than QF. In the example under consideration, 
the points satisfying the first criterion are above point T. Thus, on the one hand, they cannot include 
part of the Pareto-efficient points, and on the other hand, they may include points which are not 
Pareto-optimal. 
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The second criterion is also natural from the social point of view: from two distributions of 
the same total product the one providing more equality should be chosen. In other words, 
distribution is efficient from the viewpoint of the second criterion if an output of the same value 
cannot be achieved at a greater equality rate. In Figure 7, the line QHQH has two points of 
intersection with the consumption possibilities line (H1 and H2). In order to compare these points 
from the standpoint of the equality rate achieved, compare the values of angles  and  between 
distribution lines OH1 and OH2, and the equal distribution line OT. The second angle is less than the 
first one. Therefore, distribution at point H2 is closer to equality. 
Q2
QE
QF R
S
E
e
f
F
T
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0
45


Q1QF QE
45
 
Fig. 6: The first Criterion of Efficiency from the Standpoint of the Whole Society. 
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Fig. 7: The Second Criterion of Efficiency from the Standpoint 
of the Whole Society. 
 
One can easily see that part of points satisfying the second criterion is within the section ST 
(these points are always closer to the equal distribution line OT). The other part of such points is 
within the segment OT of the equal distribution line since it provides the most even distribution in 
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comparison with all cases when the lines showing equal volumes of the product pass to the left of 
point T. For example, consider the line QGQG. In this case, point G2 should be chosen.  
On the one hand, this set of points does not include part of the Pareto-efficient points and on 
the other hand, it includes points which are not Pareto-optimal. 
The set of points satisfying the first criterion does not completely coincide with the set of 
points satisfying the second one. Since both criteria are equally important for the society, only those 
allocations satisfying both of them will be socially optimal. The principles of selecting the social 
optimality criteria were laid down in Arkhiiereiev (2000). 
Joint satisfaction of both social efficiency criteria (fulfillment of the double criterion) is 
realized for the section ST which is part of the Pareto-efficient set of allocations located between 
points R and U (Figure 8). It may be of interest to note that the well-known Nash-solution to the 
bargaining (or arbitration) problem always selects a Pareto-efficient point within the section ST. The 
allocation fulfilling the Nash requirements for an efficient and fair distribution results from 
maximizing the welfare function Q1Q2; it has the property that the slopes of the corresponding 
distribution line  and of the tangent to the consumption possibilities line are equal which implies 
that this point must lie inside the section ST. 
It should be pointed out that the curve RU represents only one consumption possibilities line 
corresponding to a fixed amount of all resources. An increase in their amount will result in a shift of 
the consumption possibilities line to position R1U1. Moreover, as has been mentioned, the 
distributions corresponding to points of the section RS are preferable for individuals performing the 
main organizational functions. As shown in Figure 9, the section RS is characterized by the direct 
equity-efficiency relationship and the double criterion of social efficiency is not fulfilled within it. 
Existence of a section giving rise to the direct equity-efficiency relationship is due to the fact 
that point S is always to the right of point R, which can be easily proved. If the equal product line 
QRQR is a chord passing through two points on the monotonously decreasing consumption 
possibilities line, according to the Lagrange theorem there will be a point on this line the tangent to 
which will be parallel to the chord, i.e. to the equal product line. This is the maximal production 
efficiency point. Therefore, the section RS characterized by the inverse equity-efficiency 
relationship necessarily exists. 
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Fig. 8: The Double Criterion of Efficiency versus the Criterion of Pareto Efficiency, 
Initial Distribution under Consideration. 
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From the standpoint of society, it is expedient to reduce the inequality rate within this 
section to enhance efficiency. However, this goal can be attained only if society has mechanisms at 
its disposal compelling the separate entities to act in the social instead of in the individual interest. 
Naturally, society is ready to solve this problem to varying degrees in different countries. 
 
IV. The Equity-Efficiency Relationship Model 
 
The proposed model allows us to construct a graph of the equity-efficiency relationship 
reflecting the double criterion of efficiency. Let efficiency E be estimated using an indicator which 
is natural in case of a fixed amount of resources, namely the value of the product produced Q. 
Estimation of equity will be based on the inequality rate J. 
The equity-efficiency relationship obtained in this way is shown in Figure 9. Section TU is 
not taken into account since reaching a compromise within it contradicts the leading organizational 
role of the second entity. True, this section reflects peculiarities of stagnant socialism when 
remuneration of persons who played the leading role in the organization of production was often 
less than that obtained by subordinate executors. The malignancy of such an arrangement is 
graphically demonstrated in Figure 9 by the branch TU where efficiency of production is less in 
comparison with the branch TR for the same values of inequality in distribution. It is clear that the 
character of distribution, reflected by the branch TU, is both inefficient and unfair. 
R
0
S
T
U S1
R1
T1
Eq
ui
ty
Efficiency  
Fig. 9: The Equity-Efficiency Relationship in the Case of Dependence 
of the Volume of Production on the Character of Product Distribution. 
 
The other Pareto-efficient points are represented by the section TR of the graph. It should be 
noted that only the part between points S and T is consistent with the traditionally recognized 
conception of an inverse equity-efficiency relationship, i. e. a trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. Distributional considerations cannot, however, be a-priori confined to this trade-off since 
the allocations between S and T do not include all Pareto-optimal distributions but only those 
satisfying the double criterion of social optimality, while a perfectly competitive market economy, 
guaranteeing the fulfillment of the Pareto criterion, does not assure the satisfaction of the double 
criterion. The complete equity-efficiency relationship curve is represented in Figure 9 by the branch 
TR and includes the section SR characterized by the direct equity-efficiency relationship. 
 12
  
Therefore, for a particular country the task of determining the position of society relative to 
the point S of maximal efficiency in Figure 9 arises (likewise a similar task emerges when the 
Laffer curve is analyzed). Recommendations of raising efficiency presupposing either a reduction or 
an increase in the level of equity will therefore be opposed depending on the solution of this 
question. Of course, in order to work out such recommendations, it is necessary to know the 
inequality rate to which maximal production efficiency corresponds. 
However, the existence of a section compatible with the double criterion of efficiency 
inappreciably influences the real distribution in a market economy. As known, the latter can provide 
only Pareto-efficiency which does, however, not at all mean the possibility of shifting to a position 
corresponding to the double criterion of efficiency. This can be attributed to one of the 
manifestations of market failure, especially as there are always sections of the population interested 
in keeping the existing state of affairs. 
Fulfillment of the double criterion of efficiency may be achieved only consciously due to the 
regulating role of state. The point, however, is that the fulfillment of the double criterion in 
consequence of intervention of the state cannot take place within the described curve, since the 
redistribution processes in the society are always accompanied by transfer costs. As a result, the 
possible welfare curve will be represented by line RK (see Figure 10) if the society is supposed to 
be initially at position R within the Pareto-efficient section of the curve RU. 
One can easily see that redistribution the results of which are reflected by the section GJ 
appears to be more efficient than the initial distribution within the section RI in accordance with the 
double criterion of efficiency. Within the section GJ, it is impossible to obtain further 
improvements in accordance with the double criterion of efficiency. 
It should be noticed that redistribution on a small scale also does not allow the society to 
achieve a section efficient from the standpoint of the double criterion though it allows to some 
extent increase equity of distribution and efficiency of production which reaches its maximum at 
point G. A further increase in equity is possible only in exchange for a decrease in efficiency. 
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Fig. 10: The Double Criterion of Efficiency versus the Criterion of Pareto Efficiency, 
Redistribution Processes under Consideration. 
 
Thus, there is a complex relationship between these variables, since the direct function is 
changed to inverse relationship at the maximum efficiency point. Such a relationship should be 
explained by rational expectations of participants of production and distribution processes who are 
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guided not only by the character of primary distribution but also by rational expectations of the 
value of disposable income generated as a result of redistribution processes. 
The double criterion of efficiency has its own sphere of application and possesses apparent 
advantages in comparison with the Pareto-criterion. The latter cannot be applied to any 
redistribution processes in principle, since they are accompanied by costs decreasing efficiency. On 
the contrary, the double criterion can be applied to the analysis of any processes of both primary 
distribution and redistribution. 
Application of the double criterion to the processes of primary distribution allows to single 
out a section of absolute efficiency in accordance with the double criterion (the section ST in Figure 
10) which is more narrow in comparison with Pareto-efficiency and includes part of Pareto-efficient 
points. Application of the double criterion to redistribution processes allows to single out a section 
of relative efficiency in accordance with the double criterion (the section GJ in Figure 10) which 
has no relation to Pareto-efficient points but is more efficient than part of actually achievable points 
of Pareto-efficiency according to the double criterion. 
Thus, the double criterion is applicable to the analysis of redistribution processes and allows 
to single out sections which in accordance with it are more efficient than part of Pareto-efficient 
points achievable in reality as a result of primary distribution. 
 
B. Empirical Verification of the Model 
 
Verification of the proposed equity-efficiency relationship model with an extremum was 
carried out using macroeconomic indicators of efficiency of production and inequality. It appeared 
expedient to use the Gini index as a universal indicator characterizing the level of inequality. 
For the purpose of reliability of the model verification results, a period of time close to the 
duration of a business cycle was chosen. The recent decade with the centre at the edge of the 
millennium may be considered such a period. 
The data on the values of the Gini index in various countries has been comprehensively 
collected by the United Nations University WIDER (World Institute for Development Economics 
Research) out of various international and national primary sources. It also appeared true for the 
period of time selected by us for carrying out the analysis. During the period of investigation, these 
data were available in “UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0a, June 2005” 
(WIID). However, it appeared to contain data up to 2003 year, and we considered it possible to 
restrict our analysis to rather a long 8-year period. 
There are Gini indices based on different income/consumption/expenditure concepts in 
WIID. These concepts are incomparable both theoretically and practically, since the data on Gini 
indices, corresponding to them, are greatly different for the same countries and the same years. For 
these reasons, it was impossible to use data, calculated on the basis of different concepts, for one 
and the same country and one and the same year. 
For model verification, the most appropriate indicators are calculated on the basis of income. 
However, Gini indices, based on different income concepts, vary by the number of countries for 
which they are presented. In this respect, we used an income concept for which there are 
comparable data for most countries. The analysis revealed “Income, Disposable” to be such an 
income concept for which there is information by 58 countries for the period under investigation. At 
the same time, the database contains information, for example, for “Income, Gross” by 28 countries 
and for “Income, Factor” – just by 1 country. 
However, in some cases, data based on the disposal income concept (this also holds true for 
the other concepts), appeared to cover not all population and/or not all territory of a country. We 
considered it not appropriate to use such incomplete data because of their incomparability with Gini 
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indices calculated on the basis of data with full coverage of territory and population. Thus, we 
dropped 4 countries from the analysis for which only incomplete data were available. 
We also used data calculated on the basis of “Monetary Income, Disposable” together with 
data based on disposable income in case of absence of the former in view of the insignificant 
difference (for our purposes) between these concepts. The use of the data for disposable monetary 
income allowed us to involve 8 countries more in the analysis. 
In the obtained sample, for some of the countries there were data based on disposable 
income originating from more than one primary sources giving different information about the 
values of Gini indices. In this respect, for further comparability of data they were selected with the 
aim of achieving a maximally possible homogeneity of primary sources. 
Since data on EU-15 are most fully presented by European Commission, in all cases it was 
this source that was used if it was available. Another source, containing information on the indicator 
under consideration by a considerable number of countries, was “Transmonee”, and preference was 
given to this base in all cases of the absence of data from European Commission. Luxembourg 
Income Study is a well-known inequality database, and it was this base that was used as a primary 
source if there were not available data from the two mentioned above sources. Finally, information 
on Latin America is widely presented in Deininger&Squire database which was used as a primary 
source of information by corresponding countries. In the cases of the absence of information from 
the mentioned databases, data were used from national statistical sources. 
Since the Gini index, based on disposable income, was chosen as the basic inequality 
indicator, it was expedient to use a corresponding efficiency indicator. As such an overall indicator, 
we chose GDP per capita. We also decided to proceed from the principle of maximum 
comparability of data when selecting data for this indicator. In this connection, there was used the 
World Bank World Development Indicators database containing a large set of comparable data on 
the values of GDP and the number of population in various countries including the countries 
previously selected for the analysis. 
The ultimate sample included 50 countries for which there was available information for 
both indicators (Gini index and GDP per capita). Among these countries there appeared European 
Union countries (with the exception of Cyprus and Malta), OECD countries (with the exception of 
Iceland, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey), 18 Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
countries, 10 Latin America countries, as well as China. Thus, the obtained sample is representative 
insofar as it includes transition and developing countries together with developed ones. 
The preliminary analysis of the selected yearly statistical data on the value of GDP per 
capita and Gini coefficients, carried out by separate countries of various regions, has shown that the 
relationship between these indicators may be much more accurately described with a second-degree 
polynomial rather than with a linear function, which is proved by corresponding coefficients of 
determination. At the same time, application of polynomials of higher degrees rather slightly affects 
coefficients of determination; therefore, their use is inexpedient. 
The second-degree equation of the relationship between the value of GDP per capita, 
designated as Y, and the value of the Gini coefficient, denoted as g, may be written for a separate 
country k as follows: 
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where i is the index number of the year in the sample; 
nk  is the general number of years in the sample for which there are statistical data for 
country k. 
Solving the normal system of equations of the least-squares method using the Gaussian 
method, one can find the values of the coefficients in equation (10) for a country k and further find 
the value of the Gini index  which corresponds to the maximal value of GPD per capita : kg0 maxkY
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k
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However, the number of statistical data in samples by each separate country is insufficient to 
develop a reliable model of quadratic relationship between the indicators under investigation. In this 
connection, we developed a special model for calculating an optimal average level of inequality, 
determined by an optimal Gini index , for every single country included in the sample. In this 
model, some changes in the standard method of determining parameters of the quadratic equation 
using the least square method were needed. 
0g
In order to make these changes, the value of coefficient  in the initial equation (10) of the 
relationship between the value of GDP per capita  and the value of the Gini index gk for country 
k was determined on the basis of equation (12) by means of substitution of a particular optimal for a 
separate country k Gini index  to an optimal Gini index  which is considered as a single 
parameter for all countries. 
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Taking into account expression (13), the regression equation for country k will take the 
following shape: 
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The expressions for determining values of coefficients in equation (14) are found by means 
of minimizing the function: 
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where coefficients  and  are unknown quantities and the value of the optimal Gini index  
at this stage of calculations is considered as an adjustable parameter. The equations for determining 
coefficients  and  for each country can be found by means of the least squares method by 
equating to zero the expressions for derivatives of the right part of equation (15) with respect to 
these coefficients: 
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The solution of the system of equations (16) and (17) allows us to write equations for 
coefficients  and  in the following shape: ka2 ka0
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The value of the optimal Gini coefficient  was obtained on the basis of statistical data for 
all (m = 50) countries of the sample by means of minimizing average quadratic deviations, i.e. 
solving equation 
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on the basis of organizing an iteration cycle in the range of the values of the Gini index from 0 to 
100. The parameters of the quadratic equation for each country were determined in accordance with 
expressions (18) and (19). 
As a result of solution of the formulated task, there was found the value of the optimal Gini 
coefficient  corresponding to maximal efficiency for the set of the selected group of 
countries. In its turn, it allowed us to find the values of the potential efficiency of economies of each 
country out of the sample within the proposed model. To that end, equations of pair regression (14) 
were used in relation to each separate country. The values of potential GDP, corresponding to 
optimal inequality level  within the proposed model, were calculated on the basis of these 
equations. 
340 g
340 g
The same calculations were carried out for the classical model of the inverse equity-
efficiency relationship. Their implementation allowed us to obtain alternative values of the potential 
GDP. In our opinion, these estimations of the potential GDP may be used as an additional criterion 
of revealing the model best corresponding to the facts. To that end, there were found losses 
sustained by each country depending on the deviation of inequality level from the level 
corresponding to maximal efficiency for each of the analyzed models by means of comparing the 
values of potential GDP with actual data for the years under consideration. Based on these data, 
there were created tables summarizing calculations for both models under consideration. Table I 
contains the results of the analysis of the relationship between the values of GDP per capita and the 
Gini index according to the proposed model with an extremum which explains losses as a result of 
either the choice between equity and efficiency or excessive inequality. Table II summarizes the 
theoretical estimation of the losses in GDP as a result of the equity-efficiency trade-off only in 
accordance with the classical model. 
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Table I.  
Actual Efficiency and Potential Efficiency in accordance with the Equity-Efficiency Relationship 
Model with an Extremum (quite realistic results). 
 
Countries Actual efficiency 
(US$ per capita) 
Potential efficiency 
(US$ per capita) 
Estimated efficiency 
losses (%) 
Countries under the double criterion conditions  
Australia 20 936 23 826 13.8 
Austria 25 603 33 781 31.9 
Belarus 2 207 2 346 6.3 
Belgium 23 920 24 171 1.1 
Canada 20 812 25 587 22.9 
Czech Republic 5 672 6 181 9.0 
Denmark 31 595 38 986 23.4 
Finland 25 250 30 302 20.0 
France 24 201 25 946 7.2 
Germany 25 836 28 523 10.4 
Hungary 4 929 7 138 44.8 
Ireland 23 583 25 633 8.7 
Italy 20 089 21 611 7.6 
Latvia 2 906 3 899 34.2 
Luxembourg 43 480 46 245 6.4 
Macedonia, FYR 1 877 1 923 2.5 
Netherlands 24 560 27 109 10.4 
Norway 36 356 41 229 13.4 
Poland 4 256 4 294 0.9 
Romania 1 729 1 883 8.8 
Slovak Republic 3 858 4 436 15.0 
Slovenia 9 614 10 451 8.7 
Spain 15 086 15 406 2.1 
Sweden 26 908 29 819 10.8 
Switzerland 35 735 36 291 1.6 
United Kingdom 24 342 27 249 11.9 
Countries beyond the double criterion conditions 
Armenia 601 800 33.1 
Bolivia 1 005 1 101 9.5 
Bulgaria 1 508 1 571 4.1 
Chile 4 705 5 257 11.7 
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China 1 065 1 386 30.2 
Dominican Republic 1 850 2 059 11.3 
Ecuador 1 303 3 207 146.1 
El Salvador 1 957 2 935 50.0 
Estonia 3 836 4 469 16.5 
Georgia 697 765 9.7 
Greece 11 366 11 903 4.7 
Honduras 829 1 179 42.1 
Israel 17 531 17 786 1.5 
Korea, Rep. 8 595 18 036 109.8 
Kyrgyz Republic 299 313 4.6 
Lithuania 3 166 3 300 4.2 
Mexico 5 079 7 377 45.2 
Moldova 372 545 46.5 
Panama 3 269 4 420 35.2 
Portugal 10 961 11 136 1.6 
Russian Federation 2 146 2 798 30.4 
Ukraine 734 890 21.2 
United States 32 673 45 041 37.9 
Venezuela 4 041 6 989 72.9 
Average losses 22.3 
 
Table II.  
Actual Efficiency and Potential Efficiency in accordance with the Inverse Relationship Model if the 
Maximal Gini Index = 100 (unrealistically too high results). 
 
Countries Actual efficiency 
(US$ per capita) 
Potential efficiency 
(US$ per capita) 
Estimated efficiency 
losses (%) 
Armenia 601 2 387 297.1 
Australia 20 936 76 251 264.2 
Austria 25 603 84 965 231.9 
Belarus 2 207 2 650 20.1 
Belgium 23 920 25 860 8.1 
Bolivia 1 005 1 137 13.1 
Bulgaria 1 508 1 588 5.3 
Canada 20 812 104 272 401.0 
Chile 4 705 5 866 24.7 
China 1 065 3 133 194.3 
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Czech Republic 5 672 9 392 65.6 
Denmark 31 595 77 337 144.8 
Dominican Republic 1 850 2 640 42.7 
Ecuador 1 303 4 761 265.4 
El Salvador 1 957 2 505 28.0 
Estonia 3 836 13 234 245.0 
Finland 25 250 63 348 150.9 
France 24 201 49 578 104.9 
Georgia 697 986 41.4 
Germany 25 836 44 891 73.8 
Greece 11 366 20 608 81.3 
Honduras 829 1 652 99.2 
Hungary 4 929 24 115 389.2 
Ireland 23 583 68 107 188.8 
Israel 17 531 23 584 34.5 
Italy 20 089 46 947 133.7 
Korea, Rep. 8 595 30 534 255.3 
Kyrgyz Republic 299 451 50.8 
Latvia 2 906 18 053 521.2 
Lithuania 3 166 10 216 222.7 
Luxembourg 43 480 68 963 58.6 
Macedonia, FYR 1 877 3 296 75.6 
Mexico 5 079 11 472 125.9 
Moldova 372 1 365 267.2 
Netherlands 24 560 44 434 80.9 
Norway 36 356 95 008 161.3 
Panama 3 269 5 395 65.0 
Poland 4 256 19 256 352.4 
Portugal 10 961 15 009 36.9 
Romania 1 729 1 896 9.7 
Russian Federation 2 146 5 520 157.3 
Slovak Republic 3 858 9 231 139.3 
Slovenia 9 614 15 943 65.8 
Spain 15 086 23 886 58.3 
Sweden 26 908 48 905 81.8 
Switzerland 35 735 46 200 29.3 
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Ukraine 734 900 22.7 
United Kingdom 24 342 65 613 169.5 
United States 32 673 156 448 378.8 
Venezuela 4 041 14 229 252.1 
Average losses 143.8 
 
In our opinion, the results, obtained for the model with an extremum (22.3% losses of GDP 
on average), seem quite realistic while the influence of the factor of inequality in compliance with 
the classical model (143.8% losses of GDP on average) appears to be unrealistically too high. 
However, the level of inequality (Gini index = 100) for which efficiency losses were calculated in 
accordance with the inverse equity-efficiency relationship model seems to be considerably far from 
reality. Suppose that the maximal value of the Gini index in WIID = 77.6 (Zambia; 1991) is close to 
the absolute maximum of inequality which is characterized by the Gini index = 80. Therefore, we 
go over from purely theoretical value of the Gini index to its actual maximal value. Table 3 shows 
that such an assumption is more realistic than the above stated but is still considerably inferior to 
the optimal value of the Gini index calculated in accordance with the proposed equity-efficiency 
relationship model with an extremum. 
 
Table III.  
Actual Efficiency and Potential Efficiency in accordance with the Inverse Relationship Model if the 
Maximal Gini Index = 80 (unrealistically too high results). 
 
Countries Actual efficiency 
(US$ per capita) 
Potential efficiency 
(US$ per capita) 
Estimated efficiency 
losses (%) 
Armenia 601 1 806 200.4 
Australia 20 936 60 337 188.2 
Austria 25 603 69 446 171.2 
Belarus 2 207 2 558 15.9 
Belgium 23 920 25 350 6.0 
Bolivia 1 005 1 068 6.3 
Bulgaria 1 508 1 570 4.1 
Canada 20 812 80 425 286.4 
Chile 4 705 5 352 13.7 
China 1 065 2 425 127.8 
Czech Republic 5 672 8 418 48.4 
Denmark 31 595 65 710 108.0 
Dominican Republic 1 850 2 338 26.4 
Ecuador 1 303 3 143 141.2 
El Salvador 1 957 2 202 12.5 
Estonia 3 836 10 225 166.6 
Finland 25 250 53 320 111.2 
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France 24 201 42 395 75.2 
Georgia 697 879 26.1 
Germany 25 836 39 889 54.4 
Greece 11 366 17 811 56.7 
Honduras 829 1 297 56.5 
Hungary 4 929 18 966 284.8 
Ireland 23 583 55 163 133.9 
Israel 17 531 21 680 23.7 
Italy 20 089 39 237 95.3 
Korea, Rep. 8 595 23 887 177.9 
Kyrgyz Republic 299 401 34.1 
Latvia 2 906 13 565 366.8 
Lithuania 3 166 8 042 154.0 
Luxembourg 43 480 62 064 42.7 
Macedonia, FYR 1 877 2 875 53.2 
Mexico 5 079 8 841 74.1 
Moldova 372 1 013 172.5 
Netherlands 24 560 39 148 59.4 
Norway 36 356 78 695 116.5 
Panama 3 269 4 402 34.7 
Poland 4 256 14 736 246.2 
Portugal 10 961 13 731 25.3 
Romania 1 729 1 859 7.5 
Russian Federation 2 146 4 323 101.5 
Slovak Republic 3 858 7 776 101.6 
Slovenia 9 614 14 278 48.5 
Spain 15 086 21 286 41.1 
Sweden 26 908 43 093 60.2 
Switzerland 35 735 43 191 20.9 
Ukraine 734 848 15.6 
United Kingdom 24 342 53 631 120.3 
United States 32 673 115 233 252.7 
Venezuela 4 041 10 267 154.1 
Average losses 98.5 
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Taking into account the above-stated, the carried out analysis allows us to come to the 
conclusions and recommendations as follows. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The goal of this paper has been to elaborate on the equity-efficiency trade-off theory and to 
consider the relationship between equity and economic efficiency while income distribution. With 
this purpose, we construct the following groups of models: the models of the relationship between 
production outcome and proportions of distribution, consumption possibilities curves and the 
equity-efficiency relationship models at the levels of initial and final distribution. 
We extended the application of the equity-efficiency trade-off theory on the initial 
distribution, which broadens the traditional boundaries of the analysis typically concentrated on 
redistribution processes. Developing an approach from the standpoint of the equity-efficiency 
relationship with an extremum, we go beyond the limits of both the traditional equity-efficiency 
trade-off theory (standing up for the inverse equity-efficiency relationship) and the alternative 
studies showing that, on the contrary, there is a direct equity-efficiency relationship. 
We came to such a conclusion owing to the proposed double criterion of social efficiency. 
While the Pareto criterion is individualistic, the double criterion is, on the contrary, social by nature. 
Since a market economy does not ensure fulfillment of the double criterion automatically, its 
application was considered under conditions of state interference in economy. This was based on the 
supposition that there are rational expectations in the society allowing participants of production 
processes to be guided by results of final distribution but not by those of primary distribution. 
There are serious theoretical grounds to hold that there is a complex dependence (including 
parts of direct and inverse relationships) of efficiency on equity characteristic of primary product 
distribution. Redistribution processes essentially obscure this relationship which may reveal itself in 
the relationship between macroeconomic indicators or not. 
Thus, a new conception of the equity-efficiency relationship was proposed. The only 
possible way of its verification was empirical verification which was carried out in part B of the 
paper with the use of the values of the Gini index and GDP per capita. 
The paper shows that the relationship between the Gini index and GDP per capita can be 
well described using the equity-efficiency relationship model with an extremum allowing to achieve 
the greatest efficiency if the Gini coefficient = 34 (the limit of double criterion). However, this 
value of the optimal Gini index needs further elaboration based on a wider data set. 
The only thing that can be claimed quite definitely is that the traditional inverse equity-
efficiency relationship model is unrealistic, reflects only redistributive aspect of this relationship 
and corresponds to the facts only up to a certain limit. Since this model describes empirical data 
essentially worse than the proposed equity-efficiency relationship model with an extremum, it is 
expedient to go over to using the equity-efficiency relationship model with an extremum and to 
carry out further investigations in order to find the value of the Gini index, corresponding to the 
potential efficiency of social production, more accurately. 
The investigations carried out have also shown that the double criterion of efficiency does 
not hold in all countries in the present-day world. In contrast to the Pareto-efficiency, its fulfillment 
can be ensured only by conscious actions of the state but is not guaranteed by the market. In our 
opinion, it is the fulfillment of the double criterion that should be taken as a principle for ascribing 
to a country the attribute of a social market economy. The presence of redistribution processes as 
such is rather a poor criterion according to which all present-day economies may be called “social”, 
while at the same time, among them there are economies characterized by extremely high levels of 
inequality, so high even that it contradicts the purposes of achieving economic efficiency. Such 
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countries can hardly be correctly awarded the attribute of social market economies in spite of the 
presence of redistribution processes in them. 
One should also note the difference in the position of transition economies. If the double 
criterion holds in rather a large part of Central European countries, in countries of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia either this criterion does not hold or the countries are at the dangerous boundary 
beyond which the double criterion does not hold. In general, transition countries seem to have used 
the factor of increasing inequality at least up to the boundary behind which it will not make for 
increasing efficiency. Conscious observance of the second criterion in these countries will allow to 
prevent an irrational increase in inequality and a decrease in the efficiency of production, will thus 
bring about a further movement of transition economies towards social market economy. 
The obtained optimum is a boundary between countries which really have to choose 
between equity and efficiency and countries in which reduction in inequality does not at all mean 
reduction in efficiency, but, on the contrary, will result in its increase. Accordingly, social and 
economic policy of inequality regulation is to be corrected. What would be needed is not only 
accuracy of determining the optimal level of the Gini index but also a more precise measurement of 
the level of inequality in each country. However, presently these levels differ in different sources 
even for developed economies not to mention developing or transition economies. 
Only exact determination of the position of a country in relation to the optimum can show 
the necessary direction of social policy. This holds in full measure for inequality estimations for 
Ukraine which are significantly different one from another. The problem is complicated by a variety 
of different values of the Gini index for different income concepts. A shift from one concept to 
another sometimes depends not on requirements of economic analysis but on the wish to put 
statistical data in a favourable light. 
In principle, it is advisable to opt for the indicators most widespread in world practice. As it 
was mentioned above, such an indicator is the Gini index based on disposable income. On the 
contrary, Derzhkomstat (Statistical Office of Ukraine) calculates this indicator on the basis of 
expenditure, which makes it impossible to define the value of the Gini index in Ukraine more 
precisely in comparison with estimations of international organizations. If the latter are correct, the 
value of the Gini index in Ukraine corresponds to the average value of the Gini index in OECD 
countries, and it is close to the optimum calculated according to the equity-efficiency relationship 
model with an extremum. Therefore, the programs of income redistribution are rather optimal and 
should not be cut down not only from the standpoint of social protection but also with the aim of 
maintaining efficiency of production. 
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